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The United States in the
World Economy:
Problem or Solution?

by Murray L. Weidenbaum

A border was once defined as the line
separating two groups, each of which believes
that civilization ends at that line. Somehow
that reminds me of the current state of U.S.European economic relations. It is fascinating
to participate, as I recently have, in a discussion on the other side of the Atlantic on the role
of the United States in the international economy. It is so different from the discussion of
the same subject on this side of the ocean. I
would like to share with you some of the
insights that I obtained.
View One: The Angelic U.S.

As you might suspect, we Americans tend to
see our nation as the embodiment of fairness
and idealism in an otherwise nasty and selfish
world. In that view-which I label the angelic
U.S.-our strong recovery is the engine that is
pulling Europe and the rest of the world out
of recession. Our triple-digit (in billions) trade
deficit reflects the tremendous market potential which, in our naivete, we are permitting
other countries to take excessive advantage of.
In this angelic view of the U.S., Western
Europe talks about government aid to developing nations, while the United States acts-
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providing, via open trade, opportunities for
these nations to earn the foreign exchange they
so badly need. America invests a growing
percentage of its national wealth in the nuclear
umbrella that protects the entire free world.
At the same time, other nations increase investment in their own productive capacity, which
enables them to compete with aging American
industry. And, of course, the angelic view maintains that the United States is an island of free
trade in a world of subsidy and protectionism.
View Two: The U.S. As Devil

That is not quite the picture that I get on the
other side of the Atlantic. There, the United
States emerges more in the role of, shall I say
to provide a vivid contrast, the devil. Our
friends overseas remind us of the evils arising
from our loose and irresponsible fiscal policy,
how those 200 billion dollar budget deficits
have pushed up interest rates, and how the
resultant superstrong dollar is bedeviling the
economies of every other nation. All this supposedly forces our European friends to a
painful action; in order to limit the outflow.of
capital to the United States, they must mamtain high interest rates in the face of high
unemployment, all at the expense of their own
social needs.
In this second or devilish incarnation, rather
than being a firm apostle of free trade, the
United States is seen as the hypocritical nation
that maintains a firm "Buy-American" policy
while berating the trade barriers erected by
other governments. While focusing on its
massive trade deficit with Japan, the U.S. conveniently overlooks the large trade surplus it
ran with the European community over the
past decade (although not in the most recent
past).
Also, the United States, it is recalled, tried
to force an embargo of the Soviet pipeline
while selling the Russians our surplus grain.
Speaking of the Russians, I am told that the
Americans-especially Reagan Administration
spokesmen-delight in irritating the Soviet
2

Union. The Americans, in that view, com•enientlv overlook Western Europe's proximitv
and ;ur own great distance from what Ronal~\
Reagan calls the "evil empire."
View Three: A Composite Picture

readily plead guilty, of course, to considerable exaggeration in each of the two views
I have just presented. Yet there is a strong factual, albeit incomplete, basis for each of the
two views. Clearly, the attitudes on the two
sides of the Atlantic are very different. Still. the
two views are held tenaciously, and often by
people with considerable knowledge and
experience.
The nature of the problem was illustrated to
me recently when I debated the subject of
trade deficits with an executive of one of our
own large manufacturing companies. He vividly demonstrated the "flood" of imports into
the United States with the help of an unusual
set of props. He had brought with him items
from his own home which were imported from
overseas. It was an extensive collection of
foreign products which had successfully
penetrated our domestic market.
My response, I must candidly report, did not
go over nearly as well. I lamely referred to all
the American exports that were probabl) in the
homes of his counterparts in London, Paris,
Rome, and Frankfurt. But the audience had
great difficulty in visualizing my point in the
absence of physical examples that they could
see, smell, and touch. That, of course, is the
difficulty in developing an objective view of
these complicated matters. We must go beyond
the factors that we know from our own
experiences.
But let us try to develop a more balanced
view of the international role of the American
economy. Such a balanced view will show that
the United States is neither angel nor devil. but
that it is-I say candidly-part of each. To be
sure, I am reminded of the cynical comment,
that if you stand in the middle of the road, as
I am trying to do, you are most likely to be hit
3

by the passing traffic. But nevertheless, let us
persevere.
Fundamental Changes in the U.S. Economy

In their preoccupation with budget deficits,
many observers, both at home and abroad,
have overlooked fundamental changes that
have been occurring in the U.S. economic
environment. Many of these developments have
an impact in Western Europe and other parts
of the world. At any rate, this seems an opportune time to review these changes as Ronald
Reagan-the architect of many of them-nears
his second term.
The Merger Movement

For example, since January 1981. there has
been a new and more positive governmental
attitude toward mergers between large corporations. Those who favor this development
say that it is a more modern and enlightened
government position. Those who do not share
this positive view label the government's willingness to go along with these combinations
as permissive. The important point is that, during the past four years, there has been an unprecedented wave of mergers in the United
States which did not require any special laws
from Congress.

The intematio1wl implicatio11 of the
stepped-up merger move me 11 t may 110t
be \Velcomed overseas \Vith great
enthusiasm. But this is a far more
benign response to import competitio11
than traditional protectio11ist measures.
Rather, the President appointed a new
Attorney General. a new Chairman of the
Federal Trade Commission, and a new head of
the antitrust division. This favorable attitude
on the part of the antitrust agencies toward
large mergers will, to a substantial degree, continue beyond the Reagan Administration. I say
that because it is becoming clear that U.S. com4

panies increasingly compete in global markets
and domestic antitrust enforcement inevitably
has to respond to economic reality.
The international implication of this
stepped-up merger movement may not be
welcomed overseas with great enthusiasm. The
long-term result could very well be enhanced
competitiveness on the part of many American
companies. But I tell them that this is a far
more benign response to import competition
than tradi tiona! protectionist measures.
Labor-Management Relations

Another key area of the American economy
that has been ignored because of the preoccupation with budget deficits is labormanagement relations. One of the most important labor events in the United States in the
past decade was the President's breaking the
illegal strike by the air traffic controllers.
Firing the controllers was a decisive move that
signaled a fundamental turn in American
labor-management relations.
I believe it was the main reason that the
postal unions did not seriously consider going
on strike. But the repercussions of the President's action extended to the private sector as
well. There was a strong and clear signal that
the government would no longer get involved
in disputes between companies and their
unions-and certainly not on the side of the
unions. In many past administrations, the
federal government put pressure on management to settle promptly with unions. The result
was escalating wage settlements. Our high-cost
steel industry is a cogent example of the
dangers of such past government intervention.
Since 1981, we have seen a remarkable
decline in union demands. The slower rise
of labor costs, of course, has helped reduce
inflationary pressures. It has also enhanced
productivity and, hence, increased the competitiveness of American industry. Moreover,
lower inflation rates have also reduced the
ratcheting effects of cost of living adjustments
on American wage rates. Thus, we see important feedback effects at work here, the
5

economic adjustment mechanism operating at
its best.
International competition has also begun to
exert profound effects on U.S. wages, especially
in autos and steel. Currently, both labor and
management in these and other importthreatened industries find it in their mutual
interest to seek short-term relief through
quotas, euphemistically called voluntary
export restraints. They are becoming increasingly aware, however, of the need to moderate
wage increases and foster productivity growth
in order to improve the long-term health of
their industries-and thus respond constructively to the pressures of worldwide
competition.

quotas on America's steel-using industry; he
points out the fallacy of thinking that these
measures "save" jobs. Dr. Denzau estimates
that the 26,000 jobs saved in the steel industry
would reduce employment in steel-using sectors, which are also subject to global competition, by 93,000 jobs-for a net loss of 67,000
jobs.

Uneven Trade Policies

Although the United States is more protectionist than it likes to admit, it is useful to
point out to other countries the great extent to
which our trade restrictions ar-e a two-edged
sword. Embargoes on grain and soybeans curtailed our exports and increased our trade
deficit. So do restraints on high-tech trade. All
in all, it would help if the United States were
to reduce its self-righteousness in dealing with
trade matters, and also if other nations would
take our pleas for open trade more seriously.
As I see it, the United States' role in world trade
is ambivalent-neither angel nor devil.

Of course, most of our trading partners are
not very sympathetic with our efforts to protect American industry. The track record of the
Reagan Administration in this area is, at best,
uneven. The Administration said "no" to pleas
to extend quotas on non-rubber footwear but
it has supported limits on automobile imports
as well as efforts to restrict textile imports.
It would help to clear the air in international
trade discussions if the United States were to
acknowledge that all of our actions are not on
the side of the angels. We have created many
obstacles to inhibit imports into the United
States.
Although our average tariff rates are low,
high tariffs are levied on selective items. Tariffs
on textiles average 20 percent. "Buy American"
statutes give preference to domestic producers
in government procurement. The Jones Act
prohibits foreign ships from engaging in commerce between American ports. This law, of
course, effectively bars all competition in U.S.
domestic mar-ine transport.
The recent effort to further protect the
domestic steel industry furnishes another
example of the way in which U.S. trade policy
produces self-inflicted wounds. Recently,
Arthur Denzau at our Center for the Study of
American Business analyzed the effects of steel
6

All irz all, it would help if the
Urzited States were to reduce its
self-righteousness in dealing with
trade matters, arzd also if other nations
vvould take our pleas for open trade
nwre seriously.

Impact of Triple Digit Deficits

In developing a more evenhanded approach
to assessing the United States in the world
economy, we should remind ourselves that
those truly outrageous budget deficits have
helped to generate a strong recovery in the
American economy. That has led simultaneously to important desirable results in the
international economy-such as providing a
growing market for Western Europe and the
developing countries-and many undesirable
results as well-high interest rates, appreciation of the dollar, and extraordinary inflows of
capital into the U.S.
There are two derivative notions that we can
develop from this general point. One is that the
7

pluses and the minuses go together. In the
absence of the huge budget deficits and their
ramifications, I doubt that those substantial
trade deficits would have developed. The second point is that U.S. policies and practices are
not the sole source of the difficulties facing
other nations.
For example, the fall in the value of the franc
that followed the 1981 election victory of
M. Mitterand surely did not result from any
U.S. action. Rather, such adverse consequences
resulted from the financial markets' correct
anticipation of the economically troublesome
policies that Mitterand would introduce in his
first year in office.
I readily agree that we would all be better
off if our budget deficits were half their size.
And I also would be happier if I would awake
tomorrow young and handsome. I assign equal
probabilities to the two cases. Having urged,
from the outset, policies that would have
reduced those deficits, I do not now have to
apologize for them. Rather, I merely try to
realistically acknowledge their likely continuation and explain their varied impacts.
Along these lines, I reminded our European
friends that the deficits are not viewed in the
United States as a means of exporting our
domestic difficulties. Rather, the U.S. economy
itself suffers from them in many ways. Thus,
I called their attention to the fact that the
interest-sensitive sectors of our domestic
economy have suffered from the financial
effects of massive Treasury borrowing. Important examples include housing, agriculture,
and durable goods production-in what some
now call the "rust belt."
Thus, there are compelling domestic reasons
for reducing the deficits. The delay is not due
to a lack of recognition of the problem but to
insufficient public support for the politically
painful steps which would reduce the deficit
financing.

1t1atives by the White House. Budget cuts
always loom larger in the December leaks than
in the January budget. The President is satisfied that his economic program is working.
Taxes have been cut, inflation is lower than
almost anyone anticipated, and production,
sales, and employment are all continuing to
rise. As he would put it, "What more do they
want?"
Thus, in his second term, the President's
attention can and probably will shift, as it
already has in part, to foreign policy matters.
The rapid arms buildup will be maintained.
Relationships with the Russians will continue
to be difficult, but that area will also get
greater attention.
In a second term, a President starts thinking about how he will go down in the history
books. Trimming government spending may be
an important issue today, but it is not likely to
create a memorable Presidency. However, if
President Reagan succeeds in persuading the
Russians that they cannot keep up with the
American Joneses (or rather Weinberger),
perhaps they will then agree to arms reduction. Whether you believe that eventuality to
be likely or not, it is important to understand
that the President hopes that such a result will
occur. If he can achieve substantial and mutual
arms reduction, Ronald Reagan will deserve an
important place in history.
Dealing with Deficits

What about the next four years? Despite the
current rhetoric, I expect few domestic in-

As for those deficits, the proposed constitutional amendment to require an annually
balanced federal budget is looked upon by the
White House as the major response. In addition, the President's tentative approval of a
freeze on civilian spending, except social
security, raises some new hope. Given the
short-term difficulties of cutting specific
budgets, the constitutional approach is
regarded as the only satisfactory long-term
solution to the fiscal problem facing the
nation. But, because of the length of time it
would take before such an amendment would
be in force, adopting that approach would
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Future Changes in the Political Environment

necessitate little action on the budget deficit
during the next four years. A cynic might note
that the attractiveness of the balanced budget
amendment is that the tough decisions can be
postponed until Ronald Reagan's successot·
takes office.

Spending cuts should precede tax
changes. We need a national debate on
specific programs within each of the
thirteen major spending areas.
I believe that the budget deserves the same
attention as is being given to tax refom1, and
that action on spending cuts should precede
tax changes. We need a national debate on
specific programs within each of the thirteen
major spending areas. We could start by
making Dave Stockman's budget proposals as
open to the public as the recent Treasury
Department tax report.
Tax Reform

We will hear a great deal about tax reform
in 1985. President Reagan has vowed not to
raise income tax rates. That language provides
considerable flexibility. Most likely, the second
Reagan Administration will try to move toward
a flatter income tax structure. That means
broader brackets and lower rates. However, in
order to maintain the total flow of revenue to
the federal government, it becomes essential
to broaden the tax base.

In spite of a good deal of
huffing and puffing about budget cuts
and tax reforms the budget deficit will
not come tumbling down. American
fiscal policy will persist in bedeviling
other 1Wtio11s' economies.

changes that reduce investment. Under those
circumstances, the prospects for raising the
total level of federal revenue via tax reform is
surely limited. In short, in spite of a good deal
of huffing and puffing about budget cuts and
tax reforms, the budget deficit will not come
tumbling down. Thus, in the eyes of the rest
of the world-both Westem economies whose
capital flows will continue to be attracted to
the U.S. by high interest rates, and debtor nations whose interest payments will continue to
strain their economies-American fiscal
policy will persist in bedeviling their
economies.
Trade Policy

. If the Administration's efforts to negotiate
Import restraints on steel fail, we will have an
early test of Ronald Reagan's commitment to
free trade. Benefits of protectionism are concentrated by industry and geography while the
costs are widely disbursed. And it is this
political reality that legislators-who are
perpetually running for reelection-must
confront.
While the rest of the world may still view
U.S. trade policies as hypocritical, the
possibilities for greatly increased protectionism are reduced as a result of the
November Presidential election. Domestic content legislation for autos is far less likely to be
brought up as it would have been if Mr. Mandale had won. Nor are the calls for an industrial policy likely to attract as much
support.
Our trading partners should be "relatively"
pleased-it could have been worse. Realistically, they should also acknowledge that
many of their policies, affecting both basic
industry and agriculture, are far more blatantly protectionist.
Final Thoughts

The basic choice Congress will face in
broadening the tax base will be between
politically unpopular moves that reduce consumption and economically undesirable

To sum up very briefly, each of the major
Western nations faces serious economic problems of primarily domestic origin. If each
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attempts to deal with them-to get its own
house in order-we will have a healthier international economic and financial system. Of
course, it is always easier to focus on the actions of foreign devils. But the inevitable protectionist and othet- interventionist responses
only exacerbate the underlying problems.
When I am on this side of the Atlantic Ocean,
I invariably find myself opposing those who
blame forces overseas for domestic difficulties.
Perhaps it is merely an old habit, but I enjoyed
taking that position in Western Europe
recently, when I was one of those foreign
devils.
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